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Introduction
As the business of American agriculture evolves, farms are getting larger, and many farm
enterprises are becoming more specialized. Farm products are becoming more differentiated, and
often tailored to buyers' specific needs. To meet the needs of these differentiated markets,
farmers frequently must provide extensive product information, and as a result invest in more
monitoring and record keeping technologies. In addition, first handlers downstream from farms
are more explicitly focusing on better managing the supply of farm commodities to more
efficiently meet consumer demands. In the midst of these developments, formal contracts are
increasingly being used to govern the sales of farm products, rather than simple cash
transactions.
Contracts are often categorized as either marketing contracts, which are most common in crop
production, or production contracts, which are more commonly seen in livestock production.  In
both types, a grower-farmer contracts with a contractor to deliver a specified quantity and quality
of product.   For production contracts, the contractor makes most of the production decisions,
owns the commodity, assumes the price risk, and pays the farmer a fee for the production
service.   For marketing contracts, the contractor does not make most of the production decisions
nor own the commodity, but rather pays the farmer an agreed upon price for the product before it
is produced.  Approximately 50,000 farms in the U.S. have production contracts.  Half are for
poultry/egg production, with hog production a distant second.  Poultry/eggs and hogs combined
account for more than 60 percent of all production contracts in U.S. agriculture (USDA, ERS,
2003b).  Production contracting now accounts for most of the agricultural production of some
southern states (Ahearn, Jefferson, and Banker, 2003).  More than 180,000 farms in the U.S. had3
marketing contracts in 2001 (USDA, ERS, 2003b).  Significant shares of the major grains are
now marketed under such contracts, including 10 percent of corn, 9 percent of soybeans, and 5
percent of wheat in 2001 (USDA, ERS, 2003b and USDA, NASS, 2003).
Production and marketing contracts frequently provide farmers with important benefits, such as
reducing production costs and uncertainty in income streams. They can ease the spread of new
production technologies, such as advances in genetics, feed formulations, nutritional services,
fertilizers, and pest control. Contracts can also provide food consumers with products of desired
qualities at reduced prices. But contracts are sometimes controversial features of the
industrializing agribusiness sector. They may lead farmers to exchange price risks in the market
for unexpected contract risks. Under some circumstances, contracts may allow buyers of
agricultural commodities to exploit market power, by serving as a device to deter entry by other
buyers into a local market or by allowing the buyer to reduce prices paid to growers in related
spot markets.  This is a particular concern in livestock markets where the processing market is
highly concentrated, and some political leaders have recently expressed concerns that grain
markets not evolve as have livestock markets. The terms of contracts not only establish the
“prices” growers receive for their product, but they are also important determinants of the ability
of growers and processors to manage and share risks and minimize transaction costs. The
purpose of this paper is to examine how price and other nonprice terms of contracts vary for
major contracted commodities.  
Relevant Literature4
The principal-agent model is the most common economic framework employed to consider why
individuals contract.  This framework can address the two most commonly cited reasons for
parties entering into contracts, namely risk management and minimization of production and/or
transaction costs. Empirical research is mixed on which is most important.  Some of the literature
has analyzed the choice to contract or not.  For example, Key and McBride (2002) and McBride
and Key (2003) found important increases in productivity resulted from contracting in the hog
sector, compared to independent production.  The principal-agent model is also useful in
understanding the variation in risk management and contract price among those farms that have
contracts.  In the case of land contracts, Allen and Lueck (1995 and 1999) have provided
evidence that risk management is not an important factor in explaining choice of land contracts.
They find that several transaction costs (e.g., enforcement costs) are the more important factors.
In a study of the poultry industry, Knoeber (1989) and Knoeber and Thurman (1994) found that
the terms of broiler contracts could be explained largely by the incentives to produce more
efficiently.  Growers are often rewarded based on relative performance, i.e., relative to other
growers.  Most of the literature is commodity-specific, hence, there is not sufficient information
yet available on contracting to understand what forces are unique to production and marketing of
a single commodity and what forces are more general in nature.
Methods
There is a great deal of variation in the extent of contracting across individual crop and livestock
commodities, and the reasons for this are not well understood.  Contract terms are likely to vary
with the physical agronomic characteristics of the commodities and other commodity-specific5
supply and demand factors.  Hence, we have chosen to examine agricultural contracts at the
commodity level for as many agricultural commodities as our data source will allow.  For
example, we define one commodity group as flue-cured tobacco, excluding burley tobacco.
Nevertheless, we view our commodity groups as homogenous in only a very gross sense and
expect there to be some quality variation in our commodity groups for which we cannot account.
We have a two-stage approach to answering the question of how price and nonprice terms of
contracts in agriculture vary.   First, we begin by presenting descriptive statistics on the
characteristics of agricultural contracts.   Secondly, we develop a model of contract prices/fees to
better understand the effects of nonprice contract terms, as well as other variables hypothesized
to affect contract prices.
In our first stage of developing descriptive statistics on contracting we focus on eight major
contracted commodities.  The contracts considered are marketing contracts for corn for grain,
soybeans, wheat, upland cotton, flue-cured tobacco, and rice.  We also consider production
contracts for broilers and market hogs.  We describe the distribution in contract price/fees and
quantities contracted and the nonprice terms of the contracts. As an indicator of contractor
market power, we also include a measure of the reported distance from the production location to
an open market alternative.
In our second stage of determining if there is a relationship between contract terms and
commodity contract prices/fees, we develop and estimate a reduced form model of contract
price/fees separately for two commodity samples, marketing contracts for corn for grain and
broiler production contracts.   The determinants of contract price of special interest in our model6
are nonprice contract terms, such as the length of the contract and inclusion of confidentiality
clauses.  
We specified the following empirical model:
P = Χ1β1 + Χ2β2 + Χ2β3 + ε
Where P expresses the contract price or fees paid by the contractor to the grower as a function of
three sets of variables, Χ1,  Χ2, and Χ2, hypothesized to influence P.  The first set of variables, Χ1,
is a matrix of variables that capture the terms of the contract; Χ2 is a matrix of variables that
captures whole farm financial characteristics relating to risk management and performance; and
Χ3 is a matrix of variables that captures operator characteristics.
Data 
We use newly collected data on the terms of contracts, as reported on farmer surveys on the 2001
Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (ARMS), USDA.  (See the ERS website briefing
room on the ARMS (USDA, ERS, 2003a)).    The ARMS is conducted annually and collects
basic information on whole farm and selected commodity costs, returns, production and
management practices, financial position, as well as farm operator household characteristics.
Our analysis is limited by the sample size of commodities with marketing and production
contracts available in the 2001 Agricultural and Resource Management Survey, version 1.  Each
surveyed farm represents a number of similar farms in the population as represented by its7
survey weight.  The sample design is a complex design accounted for in the survey weight. The
weight, or expansion factor, was determined from the selection probability of each farm and
thereby expands the sample to represent the target population.   In recognition of the complex
sample design, we will use jackknife procedures to calculate tests of statistical significance (see
Dubman, 2000 and Kott, 1997). 
Marketing and Production Contracts Considered
We focussed our efforts on commodities for which ARMS had more than 30 observations on
contracted commodities that were grossly homogenous. Hence, for marketing contracts we are
able to analyze the following commodities:  corn for grain, soybeans, winter wheat, flue-cured
tobacco, upland cotton, and rice. Small sample sizes required us to exclude from consideration
some crops that are primarily marketed under contracts, including fruits, nuts, dairy products,
sugarbeets, and peanuts.   
A slightly smaller share of the value of commodities are produced with the use of production
contracts than with the use of marketing contracts, 16 compared to 20 percent, in 2001, and the
large majority of production contracts cover livestock commodities.  (Only 3 percent of the value
of crops are produced under production contracts compared to 30 percent of the value of all
livestock products.)  Our sample size rules allowed us to examine production contracts for
broilers and market hogs.8
Our causal analysis in the second stage is limited to corn for grain marketing contracts and
market hogs production contracts.   
Basic Characteristics of Contracts for Major Contracted Commodities
Contract prices
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the distribution of prices/fees in marketing contracts and production
contracts, respectively. Each table reports means, medians, and interquartile ranges for
prices/fees and quantities, and also compares contract prices to mean nationwide commodity
prices/fees.
Consider prices in marketing contracts (table 1). Two features stand out. First, contract prices
exhibit considerable variation in most commodities, with the exception of tobacco. Tobacco
contract prices cluster--the interquartile range in tobacco is only 4% of the median contract price.
Interquartile ranges in wheat, corn, and soybeans are 12-20% of the median, while cotton and
rice prices vary widely—the interquartile ranges are 45 and 60% of the median, respectively. 
Some of the variation in rice contract prices may reflect variety differences in contracts. For
example, average market prices for medium and short grain rice is generally very close, but
prices for long grain are about 10-15 percent higher. Contract wheat prices may be similarly
affected by the heterogeneity of the commodity, although the evidence was not strong in our
2001 sample.   The variation in upland cotton prices is not the result of variation in variety, as
with rice.  Contract price variation is largely the result of post-ginning cotton quality and market9
conditions.  In 2001, prices were higher in the beginning of the year and then declined with the
very high yields experienced in that year; so when the contract was placed had a significant
impact on contract price. 
Marketing contract prices may diverge from reported national commodity market prices for
several reasons.
1   Timing may be important, if prices vary through the year and contract prices
are realized at times that don't precisely match spot sales. Product qualities, and precise product
varieties, may also differ in ways that give rise to price differences, although we would generally
expect contracts to commonly be offered for higher valued products. A second clear feature of
the contract prices in marketing contracts (table 1) is that mean and median prices in corn,
soybean, cotton, and rice contracts exceed nationwide commodity mean prices. Nationwide flue-
cured tobacco prices slightly exceeded contract prices.  In 2001, tobacco shifted dramatically
toward almost complete reliance on contracts during the period. Finally, winter wheat contract
prices fell noticeably below nationwide means.
Now consider fees in production contracts (table 2). They also vary widely across contracts—the
interquartile range in broiler contracts covers 16 to 26 cents a head (44% of the median), while
those in market hogs range from $9.50 to 12.50 per head (28% of the median). Fees in
production contracts in turn account for small shares of the market price. In broiler production,
and in hog finishing operations, feed accounts for the largest share of costs, and that is
commonly provided by the contractor. Contractors also provide young animals and veterinary
                                                
1  We offer a caveat about nationwide mean commodity prices.  NASS may adjust spot market prices for contract
prices for some commodities and sometimes just for selected states, e.g., rice in California.  In addition, there is not
always a consistent understanding about what is a marketing contract and what is an open market sale.10
services, such that the capital and labor provided by growers receives compensation that is 13%
of the market price of broilers and 9% for market hogs.
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Contract Quantities
Tables 1 and 2 also report median quantities and interquartiles. Many crop-marketing contracts
cover strikingly small quantities. Consider corn, where the median contract quantity is only
9,161 bushels, compared to the median quantity of all corn produced by farms that have
marketing contracts of 36,195.  Corn producers that contract place only about one-third of the
corn production under contract, and most of these (88%) do this with a single marketing contract.
As the season progresses and they obtain more information about expected future prices, they
then make additional decisions about how to market their corn.  Similar judgements may hold for
other crops, like soybeans.  However, we expect some differences in the strategies used across
commodities for a whole host of reasons.  
Table 3 shows the differences in contracting by size of the contract and size of the farm for corn
and rice farms that contract.   We also compare those contracting farms to those that produce the
commodities but don’t use marketing contracts.  First of all, corn farms are less likely to use
marketing contracts than are rice farms (12% compared to 51%).   But, since corn farms that use
marketing contracts are more likely to be the large corn enterprises nearly one-third of the corn
they produce is marketed with contracts.  Rice farms are not only more likely to use marketing
                                                                                                                                                            
Nevertheless, we find it useful to compare reported contracting prices to the NASS prices because the NASS prices
are the “best” and most widely known prices available for comparison purposes.
2 McBride and Key (2003) report that growers’ share of the costs of production in contracts for market hogs in 1998
was 14%.11
contracts, but when they do use marketing contracts, they also place a greater share of their
production under marketing contracts than do corn farms with contracts (76% compared to 33%).
The share placed under marketing contracts does not differ by size of corn farm, but the share
placed under marketing contracts for large rice farms is somewhat greater than for small rice
farms. Again, we expect a whole host of economic factors are at play in these differences in the
use of marketing contracts.  
Production contracts cover essentially all broiler and hog production by growers who contract,
and contract quantities are quite substantial.  The difference between crops and livestock may be
because of the greater management input from contractors in livestock production contracts.
Since controlling disease is a major management objective, contractors may not be willing to
allow the greater risks associated with disease from additional production on the farm for which
they do not have control.
Nonprice Contract Terms
3
In terms of nonprice contract terms, the majority did not include confidentiality clauses, whether
marketing or production contracts.  Broiler production contracts were the only type of contracts
for which the majority of growers were held responsible for production loss due to poor weather
or animal death.  The majority of contracts for all 6 types of crops did require that the producer
deliver the commodity to an off-farm delivery point. The large majority of the two livestock
producer groups reported that they retained responsibility for manure management.  The majority
of broiler producers also reported that they were required to make major long-term asset12
investments, in contrast to the market hog growers. The length of contracts varied across the
commodities.  Upland cotton, flue-cured tobacco, rice, broilers, and market hogs all had median
contract lengths of 12 months.  The median length of soybean and corn marketing contracts was
only 6 months and wheat 9 months.  While there was variation in the distance to the off-farm
delivery site across commodities, none of the average or median distances were excessive.  The
producers of most of the crop commodities reported good access to open market alternatives.
Significant shares of flue-cured tobacco and upland cotton producers reported no open market
alternatives, although  access to an open market was still reported by a majority of those
producers.   In contrast, the majority of the two livestock producer groups reported no open
market access.
More commodity-specific detail is presented below:
Corn Marketing Contracts. Approximately 373,000 farms produced corn for grain in 2001, and
about 44,000 (or 12 percent) of these had marketing contracts for corn.  The corn for grain
marketed under a marketing contract in 2001 was about 11 percent of the total produced.  This
share of the corn crop marketed under marketing contracts has been relatively constant since
1991, the first year for which data are available.  Corn farms that contract, place about one-third
of their corn under contract, although that share is somewhat higher for smaller farms. The
median quantity produced under a marketing contract was 9,161 bushels.  The average open
market price for corn in 2001 was $1.89 per bushel.  The average contract price was $2.13 per
bushel.  The contract price at the 25
th percentile was $2.00 and the 75
th percentile contract price
was $2.25. 
                                                                                                                                                            
3 The ARMS briefing room includes the questionnaire.  See USDA, ERS (2003a), ARMS 2001, version 1, CRR.13
Confidentiality clauses are not common in corn marketing contracts.  The usual corn-marketing
contract requires the producer to deliver the final production to an off-farm delivery point. The
average distance to the delivery point is 21 miles, somewhat farther than the distance to the
nearest open market delivery point.  Distance to an open market does not appear to be a barrier to
engaging in open market activity, as 93 percent of producers with a corn-marketing contract
reported having an open market alternative. About one-quarter of the corn marketing contracts
hold the farmer responsible for production loss due to bad weather.  The average contract length
is 7 months, although about 18 percent are for 1 year or more.   
Soybean Marketing Contracts.  Slightly less of the soybean producing farms have marketing
contracts than do corn producing farms.  About 10 percent of soybean producing farms had
marketing contracts and these contracts accounted for about 8 percent of soybean production in
2001.  The average open market price for soybeans in 2001 was $4.37, compared to the higher
average contract price for marketing contracts of $4.82.  There was a 75-cent spread between the
25
th and 75
th percentile contract prices, proportionately larger than for corn.  The nonprice
contract terms are similar between corn and soybean marketing contracts, which is likely a
reflection of an overlap of these grower and contractor populations. 
Wheat Marketing Contracts.  Marketing contracts for wheat are relatively uncommon, less than 6
percent of producers of all wheat market their wheat through contracts. The average contract
price for wheat was $2.96 per bushel ket price in 2001. The median contracted quantity for
winter wheat was under 4,000 bushels.  The majority of contracts required the producer to14
deliver the wheat to an off-farm delivery point.  Over half of the contracts were for 12 months or
less.  The distance to an open market alternative was the same on average as the distance to the
delivery point for marketing contracts.
Flue-cured Tobacco Marketing Contracts.  Unlike for the grains, there has been a recent major
increase in the volume of flue-cured marketed under marketing contracts.   The survey indicates
that just over half of the production for all types of tobacco was marketed under marketing
contracts in calendar year 2001.  Other sources report 80 percent of flue-cured tobacco was
marketed under marketing contracts for the 2001 production year (July 2001-June 2002),
compared to 9 percent for the 2000 production year.  The average marketing contract price for
flue-cured was $1.79/lb., compared to a market price of $1.87/lb.  Fewer marketing contracts for
tobacco require the grower to deliver the output to an off-farm deliver point than for grains.  The
contract length is also longer for tobacco marketing contracts than for grains.   More than 85
percent are for at least 1 year.  With this very recent surge in marketing contracts has come less
access to open markets.  One-third of producers reported not having access to an open market.
However, for those that reported having access to an open market, the distance to this alternative
was a shorter distance on average than the distance to the contract delivery. 
Upland Cotton Marketing Contracts.  About half of the farms that produced cotton used
marketing contracts in 2001 to market cotton of all types.  The average contract price in 2001 for
upland cotton was $0.43/lb., or 5 cents more than the average open market price.  A significant
amount of variation was reported in the contract price.  The 25
th percentile price was $0.34 and
the 75
th percentile price was $0.52/lb.  The median quantity of a marketing contract for upland15
cotton was 105,000 pounds.  Several of the nonprice contract terms we examined were less
commonly reported for upland cotton than for the other commodities we examined.  Upland
cotton contracts were less likely to have confidentiality clauses and to hold the producer
responsible for production loss due to bad weather or to require the producer to deliver the
product to an off-farm location.  Most marketing contracts for upland cotton were for a year in
length, although 21 percent were for something less than 1 year.  Three-quarters of producers
with cotton marketing contracts reported having an open market alternative, with the average
distance being 31 miles. 
Rice Marketing Contracts.  Half of rice-producing farms, accounting for 38 percent of the rice
produced in 2001, had marketing contracts for rice.  The average contract price was $2.91/bu.,
compared to the open market price of $2.30/bu.   The median contract quantity was 36,350
bushels.  More rice producers reported having contracts with confidentiality clauses, 36 percent,
than producers of any other commodity, including those with hog production contracts.  About
one-quarter of producers were responsible for production loss due to poor weather conditions
and more than 80 percent of contracts required the producer to deliver the product to an off-farm
location.  The most common contract length was for 12 months, although nearly one-quarter of
contracts were for less than a year.  More than 80 percent of rice producers reported having
access to an open market alternative, and the average distance to an open market was comparable
to the average distance they reported to the required contract delivery point.
Broiler Production Contracts.  Production contracts are more common in poultry production than
any other commodity.   More than 80 percent of the value of poultry is produced with production16
contracts, although a smaller share (48%) of poultry producing farms use production contracts.
Because of the greater involvement in production management and input provision than for
marketing contracts, the contract price, or “fee,” is generally significantly less in a production
contract than the open market price.   The average fee for broilers under contract in 2001 was
$0.233 per head, compared to the open market price of $1.797 per head.  The median quantity
under contract was 336,000 head.  Confidentiality clauses were relatively uncommon in broiler
contracts, even slightly less common than for grain marketing contracts.  About half of the
broiler contracts held the producer responsible for production loss and the large majority of
contracts held the producer responsible for manure handling (90%) and required asset investment
(84%).   In addition, 11% of contracts required that producers purchase inputs from a specific
input supplier.  There was significant variation reported in broiler contract length.  Nearly fifty
percent of the contracts were for 12 months or longer, with the average contract length of 13
months.  Most of the contracts with a length of less than a year were actually for 3 months of
less.  This short-term production commitment is in spite of the long-term investment
commitment that is commonly required of broiler growers.  Broiler producers are the least likely
of all commodity producers with contracts to report having an open market alternative.  Less
than one-quarter of producers had an open market alternative to their production contract.
Market Hog Production Contracts.  Like the recent increase in marketing contracts for tobacco
there has been a recent increase in the use of production contracts for hogs.  The share of the
value of hogs that are produced with production contracts has nearly doubled since the mid-
1990s.  Currently, 53 percent of hogs are produced under production contracts.  (Comparable
statistics are not available for only market hogs.)   The average contract fee for market hogs in17
2001 was $10.71 per head, compared to the average open market price of $115.18.  More than
one-quarter (27%) of production contracts for market hogs had confidentiality clauses.  The vast
majority required the grower to retain responsibility for manure management (96%) and 30%
specified investments by the grower.  The contract length for market hog contracts was relatively
long, the average length was 30 months, although the median was 12 months.  Growers with
production contracts for market hogs were more likely than broiler growers to report open
market alternatives, but still the majority reported no open market alternative.  For those that
reported an open market alternative, the average distance was 35 miles. 
Determinants of Contract Price/Fee
We now turn to the regression results for the contract price/fee for two types of contracts:  corn
for grain marketing contracts and broiler production contracts.  We specified a linear regression
model.  Table 4 provides variable definitions and regression results.   As mentioned above, we
had three sets of independent variables, the specific variables in each set differ somewhat for the
two types of commodities.   Χ1, the matrix of variables that capture the terms of the contract for
corn marketing contracts included:  the length of the contract, penalties for production loss, and
producer responsibility for delivery; for broiler contracts these included:  the quantity under
contract, the length of the contract, inclusion of a confidentiality clause, penalties for production
loss, grower required investment in facilities and grower required purchases from a specific input
supplier, and contractors fee paid per head.  Χ2, the matrix of variables that captures whole farm
financial characteristics for corn marketing contracts included: participation in government farm
programs, use of genetically modified seed, participation in crop insurance programs, and the18
ratio of cash expenses to gross cash returns; for broiler contracts, the whole farm financial
variable included is the ratio of cash expenses to gross cash returns. The whole farm measure of
efficiency is a general farm performance indicator, however, in the case of broilers it offers
broiler-specific information, as well.  This is because broiler operations are commonly
specialized and have only one contract (Perry, et al. 1997).  The variables in Χ3, the matrix of
variables that captures operator characteristics, were the same for the corn and the broiler model
and included:  a self-reported high acceptance of risk,
4 a major occupation off the farm, and
years farming.  
As mentioned above, we use statistical delete-a-group jackknife procedures to accurately test for
parameter significance, given the complex sample design of ARMS.  In our models, this
procedure generally resulted in parameter estimates that were less significant than under standard
statistical calculations, which do not reflect the survey sample design.
The most notable observation about the regression results is the low level of significance of the
variables hypothesized to affect contract prices/fees.  We also found that the magnitudes of the
significant variables were much greater in the corn marketing contract price model than they
were in the broiler production contract fee model.  We were especially interested to see how the
nonprice terms of contracts might trade off with the contract price or fee in these two types of
contracts.  We found that generally terms of contracts were not very important with a couple of
notable exceptions discussed below.  We also found that the only variable found to be significant
in explaining prices or fees in both types of contracts was whether or not the grower-farmer had
                                                
4 We classified operators as risk-lovers if they rated themselves as a 5 or higher on a scale of 0-10, where 0 was
“Avoid risks as much as possible” and 10 was “Take risks as much as possible.”19
an off-farm job as a major occupation. The magnitude of the major occupation effect was
significantly greater for corn marketing contract prices than it was for broiler production contract
fees.  Other studies have shown that having an off-farm job as a major occupation leads to a
greater probability of contracting (e.g., McBride and Key).  Presumably, this is because of the
greater rigidities in managing more than one career and the lessening of the marketing burden for
an operator with a marketing contract.  Our results show that if a farmer’s major occupation was
not farming, then the contract price/fee tended to be lower than if the major occupation was
farming.  Hence, this represents a trade-off some farm operators choose to make in securing a
major occupation off the farm.  
Corn Marketing Contracts
Nearly three-quarters of all corn for grain marketing contracts are between farmers and co-ops or
grain elevators.  These are the major purchasers of corn on the spot market, as well. A major
motivation for a farmer to enter into such a contract is to avoid price risk and income variability,
and a major motivation for the contractor to enter into a contract is to ensure a steady supply of
product.  Both farmers and downstream handlers are motivated by the incentives to produce the
product at a low per-bushel cost.  Since crop prices vary significantly over the growing season,
we hypothesized that contract length would have a positive impact on contract prices.  Having
longer contract lengths did indeed tend to contribute to higher contract prices, as much as 20
percent higher for contracts of 12 months or longer.  We also found that when the operation
produced genetically modified corn for grain, the contract price was lower.   We expected to find
that result because of the continuing concerns about marketability of GM corn, especially20
internationally, that pays non-GM corn a premium.  We also included two additional risk-
management related variables in the corn model—participation in the government farm programs
and having crop insurance—neither of which were significant.  As mentioned above, the
nonfarm major occupation was significant and this is certainly related to risk management from
the farm household perspective.   The human capital variables of the corn model—operator
experience and farm expense ratio—were not significant in the model.  Again, this is consistent
with the emphasis of a corn marketing agreement being largely focussed on providing a
consistent product for a set price.  Yield-risk is with the producer, and has no effect on
negotiated contract price. 
Broiler Production Contracts
Analyzing the terms of broiler contracts is challenging because of the performance-based
features that are commonly part of these contracts.   Under these types of contracts, commonly
called tournaments, growers are paid basic, and relatively standard, per-head fees and in addition
are paid bonuses based on their performance relative to other growers in the tournament.
Depending on the contract, they may also be paid a penalty for death loss. Our measure of
contract fee is intended to capture all of these returns. (However, precise measurement of the
terms and the relevant implications of these tournaments are likely not fully available in our data
source. For example, bonuses, the most important variable in the contract fee, may not be paid in
the same year as the production or known at the time of data collection.) Because contractors
contribute significant shares of the inputs and reward growers for the efficient use of these inputs
under performance-based systems, we have included two variables which allow us to capture21
how contractor-provided expenses might trade off with grower fees received.  We expected the
contractors’ expenses per head to be negatively related to the contract fee. However, it was not
significant. We also included an indicator of whole farm expenses, the ratio of expenses to gross
cash returns, in the model as an indicator of grower efficiency.  Generally speaking, the higher
the value of this ratio, the lower the grower efficiency.  It was significant and had the expected
sign, indicating that less efficient growers received a lower contract fee.  We explain these two
results regarding expenses with reference to the prevalence of tournament contracts.  The
contractor share of expenses covered per head is relatively constant across contracts, hence we
did not find the contractor expenses per head to be significant in explaining contract fee.
However, under the performance-based system, growers are paid bonuses for exceptional
efficiency, hence we did find the whole farm measure of expenses to returns to be significant.
The only nonprice contract term that was significant, and positive as expected, was the growers
responsibility for death loss.  The dummy size variable for the smallest quantity class was
significant and positive.  We expected to see a negative relationship between the grower fees and
this small size class because we would expect contractors to realize some pecuniary
diseconomies with managing small contracts.  Perhaps we found this result because the small
operations are providing a higher valued broiler, but we don’t have the data to explore this
further.  Besides the grower reporting a major occupation as an off-farm job as discussed above,
growers’ years of experience in agriculture was another personal farmer characteristic that was
significant in explaining contract fee. However, the sign of this variable was opposite to what we
hypothesized.  Growers with more experience in agriculture tended to receive a lower contract
fee.  This may be an indication of more experienced growers having less alternatives off the farm22
and more on-farm investment, allowing market power of the contractors to offer them lower
contract fees.  Alternatively, this may simply be that the experience measure is a poor indicator
of human capital of the grower.  However, McBride and Key (2003) found that grower
experience in hog production had a positive impact on contract fees in market hogs, where our
measure of experience was the more general years in agricultural production.  Again, we don’t
have the data to explore the causes of this negative sign of experience for broiler contracts with
confidence.
Conclusions
The discussion preceding the most recent farm bill included concerns about contracts in
agriculture, such as regarding the use of confidentiality clauses and allowance of so-called
“captive supplies.”  While the decision to contract is voluntary, some in the profession and in the
larger policy arena have argued that many producers effectively have no alternative but to
contract in some production locations.  However, the empirical support for this has been largely
anecdotal.  The analytical findings reported in this paper suggest that in 2001 the lack of an open
market alternative was not a widespread issue for crop producers who contract, but may be of
concern for producers of broilers and market hogs in some areas.  The paper has also shown that
the majority of contracts do not include confidentiality clauses, and at least for broiler contracts,
when controlling for other factors, confidentiality clauses were not a significant factor affecting
contract fees. We found quite a bit of variation in nonprice terms of contracts but not strong
evidence that these nonprice terms are critical in determining contract prices or fees.  This was
even the case for broiler contracting with a decades-long history to allow contracts to mature. 23
However, because the supply chain is evolving rapidly, we expect contract terms to change
continuously in the near future.  Of course, this dynamic will present a significant challenge in
the collection of farm-level data for economic research in this area. The creative incentives
incorporated into contracts to meet even higher efficiency goals--such as the performance-based
incentives of many poultry contracts--or the costs of record-keeping requirements necessary as
part of a consumer-driven demand for traceability, coupled with the longstanding sensitivity of
collecting contractor expenses, are but the obvious examples.  Access to meaningful commodity
prices will continue to be of major interest to all producers and contractors, and a challenge to
statisticians and researchers, in light of the rapidly changing market arrangements. 
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Table 1. Marketing Contracts, 2001
Unit Corn for
grain






Share of producing farms
with contract
Percent 11.8 9.1 5.2 29.8 49.7 50.7
Share of value under contract Percent 10.8 7.9 4.7 49.6 50.6 37.9
Contract price
Average Dollars 2.13/bu. 4.82/bu. 2.96/bu. 1.79/lb. 0.43/lb. 2.91/bu.
Coefficient of variation Percent 1.41 5.24 7.58 2.23 10.39 9.62
25th percentile Dollars 2.00 4.25 2.35 1.80 0.34 1.84
Median Dollars              2.10 4.60 2.79 1.85 0.40 3.10
75th percentile Dollars 2.25 5.00 3.04 1.87 0.52 3.70
U.S. market price Dollars 1.89 4.37 2.77 1.87 0.38 2.30
Contract:market price Ratio 1.13 1.10 1.07 0.96 1.13 1.27
Contract quantity
Average Quantity 19,842 8,385 9,430 56.807 267,340 48,911
25th percentile Quantity 5,000 2,018 2,200 21,000 15,840 26,100
Median Quantity 9,161 5,000 5,000 52,920 105,000 36,350
75th percentile Quantity 21,000 10,000 10,000 75,000 310,949 68,600
Nonprice terms
Confidentiality clause Percent 16.3 17.9 8.0 na 10.2 36.2
Farmer responsible for:
production loss Percent 23.6 15.4 12.6 na 9.1 25.2
delivery off farm Percent 86.4 83.2 79.5 66.9 56.9 83.1
Contract length
Average Months 7 7 7 14 11 10
Median Months 6 6 7 12 12 12
12 months or more Percent 18.0 23.8 27.5 85.3 72.9 70.1
Less than 12 months Percent 66.1 56.7 57.1 7.5 17.9 21.1
   6-11 months Percent 35.4 22.8 17.6 na na na
   6 months or less Percent 48.8 49.0 46.1 na na na
   3 months or less Percent 21.0 25.7 37.3 na na na
None reported Percent 15.9 19.5 15.5 7.2 9.2 8.8
Distance to contract delivery
Average Miles 21 27 28 29 8 20
Median Miles 10 10 10 22 6 10
Open Market alternatives:
Open market reported: Percent 92.8 92.9 89.1 66.5 76.1 84.4
None reported Percent 7.2 7.1 10.9 33.5 33.9 15.6
Distance to open market:
Average Miles 13 13 12 22 31 24
Median Miles 9 9 7 15 33 20
Sample size Farms 213 158 92 58 135 63
Source:  2001 ARMS, USDA
Contract adoption statistics are for all tobacco, and cotton, not just  flue-cured tobacco, and upland cotton, respectively.26
na = Insufficient data for disclosure  27
Table 2. Production Contracts, 2001
Unit Broilers Market Hogs
Contract adoption
Share of producing farms with
contract
Percent 47.9 14.2
Share of value under contract Percent 81.3 53.4
Contract fee
Average Dollars 0.233/head 10.71/head
Coefficient of variation Percent 4.29 6.35
Median Dollars 0.229/head 10.72/head
25th percentile Dollars 0.16 9.5
75th percentile Dollars 0.26 12.5
U.S. market price Dollars 1.797 115.18*
Contract fee:market price Ratio 0.13 0.09
Contract quantity
Average Quantity 398,332 5,483
25th percentile Quantity 214,281 1,700
Median Quantity 336,000 5,483
75th percentile Quantity 516,000 13,000
Nonprice terms
Confidentiality clause Percent 15.4 27.2
Farmer responsible for:
production loss Percent 53.2 Na
specified investments Percent 83.5 30.1
specified input suppliers Percent 10.8 Na
manure Percent 90.2 95.9
Contract length
Average Months 13 30
Median Months 12 12
12 months or more Percent 48.6 82.7
Less than 12 months Percent 39.7 17.3
   3 months or less Percent 36.5 Na
None reported Percent 11.7
Open Market alternatives:
Open market reported: Percent 23.0 44.1
None reported Percent 77.0 55.9
Distance to open market:
Average Miles 33 36
Greater than 50 miles Percent 20.5 35.4
Sample size Farms 326 45
Source:  2001 ARMS, USDA
Contract adoption statistics are for all poultry and hogs.
na=Insufficient data for disclosure
*=Based on a market hog weighing 260 lbs.28
Table 3.  Quantities marketed under contract for corn and rice farms, 2001
Corn farms Rice farms Variable
With contract No contract With contract No contract
Share of commodity farms  12% 88% 51% 49%
Share of commodity production 32% 68% 51% 49%
Average acres in commodity
per farm
400 148 389 376
Farms’ commodity production
under marketing contract as a
share of all production on farm
33% 0 76% 0
   Small farms
1 34% 0 65% 0
   Large farms
1 33% 0 77% 0
Sample size 1181 159
1Small farms are those with less than $250,000 in total value of farm production.  Large farms
are those with $250,000 or more.
Source:  2001 ARMS, USDA29
Table 4. Regression Results for Contract Price/Fee for Corn and Broiler Contracts, 2001
Parameter Estimate  Variables Definition
Corn  Broiler 
Intercept Intercept 2.3582*** 0.2032***
Quantityquartile1 Dummy variable = 1 when quantity
contracted is in lower quartile of quantity
distribution
-- 0.0326*
Quantityquartile2 Dummy variable =1 when quantity
contracted is in second quartile of quantity
distribution
-- 0.0107
Length6_11 Dummy variable =1 when contract length is
6-11 months
0.1381** --
Length12_plus Dummy variable =1 when contract length is
for 12 months or more
0.2048*** 0.0089
Confidentiality Dummy variable =1 when contract had a
confidentiality clause
-- 0.0021
Prodloss Dummy variable =1 when contract required
grower to accept responsibility for
production loss
0.0036 0.0180*
Required_delivery Dummy variable = 1 when contract required
grower to deliver commodity off the farm
-0.0750 --
Required_invest Dummy variable = 1 when contract required
grower to invest in long term assets
-- 0.0028
Required_input Dummy variable = 1 when contract required
grower to purchase inputs from specified
provider
-- 0.0230
Govtprogram Dummy variable = 1 when farmer
participates in government commodity
programs
-0.1797 --
Gmseed Dummy variable = 1 when farm produced
GM corn crop
-0.1310* --
Cropinsurance Dummy variable = 1 when farm business has
crop insurance
-0.1104 --
Cont_paid_expense Contractor input expense per head -- 0.0438
Expenseratio Ratio of farm variable expenses to farm gross
cash returns
0.1241 -0.0254*
Risklover Dummy = 1 when farmer’s self rating of
acceptance of risk is at the high end of a
Likert scale
-0.0247 0.0095
Off-farmwork Dummy = 1when farmer’s major occupation
is an off-farm job
-0.2076** -0.0180*




Adjusted R-square 0.2094 0.2225
F value 7.44*** 7.61***
* Denotes significance at 10%; ** Denotes significance at 5%; *** Denotes significance at 1%.